

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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DATE: 22 Aug. 1951

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: Staff Planning Project No. 26: Eastern European Satellites

1. Control and Stability

Soviet Russian control over the Eastern European Satellites is virtually complete already and should be perfected by mid-1953. The Satellite governments and Communist Parties are now all controlled by men loyal first to the Soviet Union. The political and cultural opposition in each state has been ruthlessly broken and its economic foundations destroyed. The economy of each country operates for the benefit of Soviet economic and military power, and through institutions such as CEMA Kremlin authority over the total economy of the area has been made complete.

Soviet occupation troops and air forces, Soviet training of and penetration into the local secret police and external security forces, Soviet missions and representatives throughout the military establishments, the adoption of standard Soviet weapons and reliance upon the Soviet Union for supplies and items such as tanks and aircraft, and mutual aid treaties (with the exception of Albania) -- all assure continued and increasing Soviet control and ability to use the strengths of the Satellites.

It is very likely that there will continue to be trials and purges, excursions and alarms throughout the Eastern European Satellites, but these will strengthen rather than weaken the Soviet

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grip. No opposition forces or restive elements have or will have the power and organization to constitute more than a minor irritation or nuisance against security forces with the skill and resolve of those now in power.

It is almost certain that Communist ideology and political and economic necessity will lead to an intensification of the drive for collectivization throughout Eastern Europe by mid-1953. Soviet experience and skill in this operation should limit the difficulties this operation will inevitably entail and should prevent the discontents from developing into serious threats to order and security. It is possible, however, that collectivization could cause troubles of sufficiently serious character as to limit temporarily the military capabilities for offense of the Satellite armies.

## 2. Military strength

The armies of the Eastern European Satellites increased in size approximately 30% from January, 1950 through mid-1951, and it is believed that they will increase an additional 60% by mid-1953. These armies now contain 862,000 men, organized into 65 divisions, of which 4 are armor and 9 mechanized. By fall, 1953, they will total about 1,450,000, or 117 divisions, of which 11 will be armored and 18 mechanized. These armies by mid-1953 will be reliable instruments for the Soviets and will be capable of independent military action, provided the Soviet Union is willing to provide logistical support and to risk a general war. Soviet

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domination of these armies and Soviet cleansing and training of them should be so complete by mid-1953 that the Kremlin could rely confidently upon them for joint offensive operations with the Soviet armies against the West. Their loyalty would probably be shaken severely only should the Soviet Union suffer a series of reverses in a general war.

### 3. Economic Strength

The Eastern European Satellites constitutes a very valuable increment to the economy of the Soviet Union. They produce 2/3 of the uranium ores and concentrates of the Soviet orbit; they are large producers for the Soviet Union of POL, coal, and chemicals for fertilizers and explosives; they contribute large quantities of heavy engineering and transportation equipment to the Soviet Union; they provide electronic equipment and technical knowledge. At the same time, the Eastern European Satellites, especially Poland, are exporters of coal and foodstuffs needed by Western European countries and are therefore avenues by which the Soviet Union has been able to acquire from the West materials vital for its war economy, such as rubber, tin, ball bearings, machine tools and parts, and precision instruments.

These Satellites have added strains and weaknesses also to the Soviet economy, although these are far outweighed by the advantages gained. The Satellites require for their continued hasty industrialization many crucial raw materials and some kinds of equipment which are in short supply in the Orbit in general and which it is increasingly difficult to obtain from the West. Although

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complete Soviet power to control the allocation of critical materials and equipment should limit the impact these shortages will have, it is obvious that an effective continued Western restriction on exports to the Orbit will seriously delay completion of the present industrialization programs and flatten out the rising curve of satellite industrial production.

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